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Abstract 
 
In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of 
relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage 
companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better 
analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic 
profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP), the inverse of which is 
demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s 
actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance 
(TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. 
The results indicate that during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were 
high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. 
However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive 
companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. 
When compared to alternative methodologies such as DEA and SFA, our index number based 
approach has the further advantage of allowing meaningful comparative performance 
measurement even if the number of available observations is extremely limited. We therefore 
suggest that our approach should be of great interest, not only to those researchers interested 
in evaluating the effectiveness of regulation, but also to those researchers more focused on 
developing effective comparative performance techniques, even if sample sizes are limited.   
 
 
Keywords: Profits, productivity, price performance, index numbers, regulation,   
water industry 
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1. Introduction1
The Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales were 
privatized as natural monopolies and thus they had strong incentives for monopoly 
pricing and weak incentives for operating efficiently. A regulatory body, the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat) was set up in order to incentivize firms to achieve both  
productive and allocative efficiency. The method of regulation in UK water and 
sewerage sector is price cap regulation  and is designed to give firms incentives to 
increase profits by reducing costs by eliminating the potential to manipulate prices 
and is preferred to rate of return regulation, which potentially leads to 
overcapitalization (Averch-Johnson, 1962). 
In this paper, we demonstrate that the effectiveness of a price cap scheme;  
e.g. whether it encourages regulated firms to achieve efficiency in production as well 
as appropriate allocatively efficient pricing; can be evaluated by determining the 
relationship between productivity, price performance and profits across firms. 
Moreover, the underlying index number techniques also allow for comparative 
performance measurement assessment even in cases where the number of 
observations is extremely limited.  Thus, when compared to alternative methodologies 
such as DEA and SFA, which require a relatively large number of observations to 
specify an efficient frontier, index number techniques provide a considerable 
advantage.   Previous studies that illustrated the relationship between profits, 
productivity and price performance using index number techniques include Water and 
Street (1998), Han and Hughes (1999), Saal & Parker (2001), Salerian (2003), and 
Diewert & Lawrence (2006).  
Our approach could be naively seen as a minor development of Saal & Parker 
(2001), which employed a methodology that only allowed the measurement of firm-
specific profitability, productivity and price performance indices over time.   Thus, 
our study instead employs a cross sectional (spatial) index number technique to 
measure differences in the level of productivity, price performance and profitability 
across firms (relative comparative performance).  However, moving from the 
consideration of firm-specific indices to a spatial approach firstly allows comparative 
performance assessment, which makes the approach directly applicable by regulators 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to express their gratitude for the support of the Economic and Social Science 
Research Council as well as the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), and note that the usual disclaimer 
applies.  
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in setting price caps. Secondly, and more significantly, it also allows the development 
of the theoretically consistent model of price cap regulation presented in this paper. 
As a result, the approach employed in this paper facilitates an analysis of whether 
price caps are consistent with the achievement of productive and allocative efficiency, 
which was simply not possible with the methodology employed by Saal and Parker 
(2001). 
The key theoretical contribution that is allowed by the spatial orientation 
employed in this paper is the decomposition of a firm’s actual economic profitability 
into two sources: a spatial multilateral Fisher productivity index (TFP) and a newly 
developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index. The former is calculated 
using theoretically consistent relative productivity comparisons across companies in 
any given year (multilateral spatial comparisons) after assuming the most productive 
company is the base or benchmark firm.  Moreover, we demonstrate that the inverse 
of a spatial multilateral TFP index can be interpreted as a regulatory excess costs 
index, which measures the excess of a firm’s actual costs relative to benchmark costs. 
The regulatory TPP index is derived as a function of this regulatory excess cost index  
and the actual economic profitability index, and measures the excess of regulated 
revenues relative to benchmark costs. As such, it provides a direct measure of how 
tight price caps are, measured by the proportional deviation between allowed revenues 
and benchmark costs.  Further consideration of the theoretical relationship between 
actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price 
performance allows a characterisation of the power of regulatory price caps, and we 
illustrate this by offering an analysis of changes in the estimated power of price cap 
regulation in the English and Welsh water industry over the period 1991-2008.  
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential application of 
index number techniques for measuring actual profitability, relative productivity and 
price performance and its adaption under price cap regulation. Section 3, then 
considers the methodology necessary to empirically apply this approach in a 
multilateral setting. The next section provides a discussion of data employed, and the 
following section details the empirical results. Section 6 then offers some conclusions, 
as well as suggesting a potential extension of the model.   
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2. Relative Profitability, Productivity and Price Performance         
A firm’s economic performance is commonly measured by its economic 
profitability (π). However, changes in profitability can be decomposed into changes in 
productivity and price performance. Total factor productivity (TFP) captures changes 
in performance attributable to increased physical production of outputs relative to 
inputs.  In contrast, total price performance (TPP) captures the impact of changes in 
output prices relative to input prices.  Comparing changes in TFP and TPP therefore 
allows determination of whether profit change is primarily explained by 
improvements in productivity or is simply attributable to an increase in output prices 
relative to input prices that has improved the firm’s price mark up relative to actual 
costs.  
Saal & Parker (2001) demonstrates an index number approach to decompose a 
firm’s economic profitability change into TFP change and TPP change.  For any given 
firm, this methodology allows identification of the relative contributions of 
productivity and price performance to observed profit change and the paper illustrates 
how changes in regulatory policy influenced both the productivity change and price 
performance change of regulated water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England 
and Wales (E&W). Nevertheless, while this methodological approach has the strong 
advantage of allowing the decomposition of profit change even if data is only 
available for a single firm, it only allows comparison of cross firm differences in the 
rate of change of TFP, TPP and profitability. Thus, the lack of any cross sectional link 
between firms’ indices makes it impossible to measure differences in the level of TFP, 
TPP and profitability across firms.  The implication of this limitation is highlighted if 
one notes that Saal & Parker (2001) considers an industry subject to price cap 
regulation in which prices are set using a comparative yardstick regime that measures 
firm performance levels relative to other regulated firms, but it does not in fact 
provide a methodology that allows for measurement of such performance differences. 
This paper therefore proposes a spatial alternative to Saal & Parker (2001) that allows 
for measurement of a firm’s TFP, TPP and profit performance relative to its peers at 
any give time. 
In this section we first illustrate spatial indices of economic profitability and 
their decomposition in any given year of our sample and how we can employ spatial 
indices of productivity and price performance under an ideal incentive regulation 
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regime. After this illustration, Section 3 will tackle the thornier issue of applying this 
concept in an empirical multilateral setting. 
Spatial Profitability, Productivity, and Price Performance and its Adaptation to 
Price Cap Regulation 
In this section we consider the relationship between profits, productivity and 
price performance for firm i relative to a base firm b at time t which we call a spatial 
index, thereby adopting the terminology employed in the price index literature (Hill, 
2004). As a result of its definition, these indices only directly measure differences in 
performance in the spatial dimension (between firms) at any given time.   
We define the economic profits of the base firm b at time t, , as a ratio of 
its total revenues,  and total costs, , at time t. Thus, the total revenues of the 
base firm at period t are defined as
tb,Π
tbR , tbC ,
b tbtbtb YPR ,,, ×= , where and  respectively 
present the output price index and the aggregate output index of the base firm at 
time t. Its total costs at year t, , are defined as 
tbP , tbY ,
b
tbC , tbtbtb XWC ,,, ×= , where  and 
 denotes the input price index and the aggregate input index respectively of the 
base firm at time t. Similarly, we can define the economic profitability of any firm at 
time ,  as a ratio of its total revenues,  and its total costs, . We can thus 
define and decompose a spatial economic profitability index for any firm  relative to 
the base firm at time t,  as follows: 
tbW ,
tbX ,
i
t ti ,Π tiR , tiC ,
i
b S tb,π
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Thus, at time t, a spatial economic profitability index,  can be expressed as a  
function of an index of  spatial total factor productivity for firm i relative to the base 
firm b,  and a spatial  index of total price performance between firm i and the 
base firm b, .  As 
S
ti,π
S
tiTFP ,
S
tiTPP ,
S
ti
S
ti
S
ti XYTFP ,,, =  and StiStiSti WPTPP ,,, =  these indices can be 
further decomposed as functions of the spatial output ( tbti
S
ti YYY ,,, = ), input 
( tbti
S
ti XXX ,,, = ), output price ( tbtiSti PPP ,,, = ) and input price ( tbtiSti WWW ,,, = ) 
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indices.  This decomposition of spatial profitability highlights that, at any given time, 
observed differences in profitability between firms can be explained by differences in 
productivity, differences in price performance, or differences in both.   
By definition spatial indices estimate firm i's performance relative to any 
potential base firm b.  However, one of the goals of an ideal incentive regulation 
system is to incentivize firms to improve their productivity so as to catch up to the 
productivity levels achieved by the frontier or most productive firm.  Therefore, a 
natural candidate for the base firm is the firm that has the highest relative level of 
productivity at time t.  This is because  then becomes an easily interpretable 
index of any firm’s TFP as a proportion of the best observed productivity level.    We 
therefore henceforward define the base firm (b) as the firm with the highest 
productivity observed at time t.     
S
tiTFP ,
However, allocative efficiency is also a goal of an ideal incentive regulation 
regime, as output prices should in principle be just sufficient to cover the efficient 
economic costs of production. Stated differently, if output prices are allocatively 
efficient, the most productive regulated companies should achieve a normal rate of 
return, or equivalently economic profits should be equal to zero.  In contrast, less 
productive firms should in theory have output prices that would allow them to achieve 
a normal rate of return only if they achieved the productivity levels achieved by the 
most productive firm.  We therefore choose to adapt our definition of spatial TPP so 
rather than being based relative to the actual output price index of the base firm ( ), 
it is instead based to the output prices that are consistent with zero economic profits 
for the base firm ( ).   
tbP ,
*
,tbP
Mathematically, this is easily accomplished by first noting that if the base 
(highest productivity) firm at time t makes zero economic profits, then 
1
,,
,,
,
,
, ===Π
tbtb
tbtb
tb
tb
tb XW
YP
C
R
.  By simply rearranging this expression, and after assuming 
that input prices are exogenous, we obtain the following expression for the optimal 
output price for the best practice firm, which is consistent with the regulatory goal of 
achieving allocative efficiency: 
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(2)                                                            
,
,
,
*
,
tb
tb
tbtb Y
X
WP =
                      
  is an obvious restatement of the condition that for a firm achieving the highest 
observed productivity, prices should be set such that total revenues are equivalent to 
economic costs, thereby making economic profits equal to zero. Moreover, it is 
illustrative to note that in the case of a single output, this is consistent with  being 
equal to average long run total costs.    
*
,tbP
*
,tbP
The simple substitution of  for  in  completes the construction of 
a “regulatory” TPP index ( ), which indicates the contribution to profitability 
that can be attributed to deviation of firm i's output prices from those that would be 
consistent with achieving the same productivity as the base firm, and also realizing 
zero economic profits:   
*
,tbP tbP ,
S
tiTPP ,
 ,
R
tiTPP
 
 (3)                                                                                   
,,
,,
,
,
,
,
,
,
*
,
,
,
tbti
tbti
tb
tb
ti
ti
tb
ti
tb
ti
R
ti XW
YP
Y
X
W
P
W
W
P
P
TPP =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
==  
 
As suggested by the term after the first equality,  indicates the deviation of firm 
i's output price from those that would be appropriate given its input prices and the 
assumption that it achieved the same productivity as firm b. It should also be clear 
that increases (decreases) in   can be interpreted as loosening (tightening) of 
regulatory price caps, because this reflects an increase (decrease) in allowed revenues 
relative to benchmark costs.  We can begin to further characterize regulation if we 
focus on the term after the second equality, if , 
R
tiTPP ,
R
tiTPP ,
1, =RtiTPP tbtbtititi YXWPP ,,,*,, == and firm i 
will achieve a normal rate of return if it achieved the productivity level of the base 
firm.  If   then , thereby suggesting that the regulatory price  has 
been set “low” as the firm would make an economic loss even if it achieved the 
productivity levels of the best firm.  In contrast, if , then , thereby 
1, <RtiTPP *,, titi PP < tiP ,
1, >RtiTPP *,, titi PP >
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suggesting that the regulatory price  has been set “high” as the firm would make an 
economic profit  if it achieved the productivity levels of the best firm.  
tiP ,
 Given the regulatory definition of  , multiplying it by , no longer 
results in the spatial measure of profitability ( ) detailed in (1).  As (4) 
demonstrates the product of  and  has the advantage that it results in the 
direct measure of actual firm specific economic profitability 
R
tiTPP ,
S
tiTFP,
S
ti,π
R
tiTPP ,
S
tiTFP,
ti ,Π  previously defined 
above:   
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Interpretation of (4) also demonstrates several useful implications from a regulatory 
perspective.  Focusing on the base firm and given our assumptions,  thereby 
revealing the rather obvious finding that the base firm has achieved the regulatory 
target of achieving best practice TFP. As a result, for the base firm any economic 
profits (losses) result in (
1, =StbTFP
1, >Π tb 1, <Π tb ) and imply that  ( ).   Thus, 
from a regulatory perspective, for the base firm, economic profits (losses) can only 
result from “inappropriately” high (low) output prices such that  ( ).  
e.g. for the most productive firm, economic profits or losses can only be attributed to 
regulatory output prices that are not consistent with zero economic profits, and as a 
result revenues exceed economic costs. We would note that, in a regulatory context 
where regulators set price caps that include both “catch-up” and “continuing 
improvement factors”, it is more than plausible that  a regulator could set  in 
order to incentive the base firm to further improve its underlying TFP in the future.   
1, >RtbTPP 1, <RtbTPP
*
,, tbtb PP > *,, tbtb PP <
*
,, tbtb PP <
For any other firm i. if ,  and the regulator has set prices so as 
to fully incentivize the firm to catch up to the productivity of the base firm.  As a 
result, and the firm’s profitability index, will deviate from 1 in exact 
proportion to its spatial TFP.  In this situation the firm will be making an economic 
loss because of its below par TFP performance. Moreover, it could be argued that 
such losses are appropriate as the firm’s revenues have been set equal to an 
1, =RtiTPP *,, titi PP =
    ,,
S
titi TFP=Π
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appropriate benchmark cost associated with the best TFP performance, but the firm’s 
costs exceed these costs by the proportion StiTFP ,1  .  Therefore, these economic losses 
are consistent with setting regulated prices so as to incentivize the firm to fully close 
the productivity gap between it and the base firm.    
When , output prices, and hence *,, titi PP ≠   ,tiΠ are not consistent with the 
spatial productivity benchmark . If,  then  and as a result 
.  In this situation regulated revenues are below the benchmark economic 
costs implied by , and the economic losses of the firm are partially explained by 
low output prices that imply the firm would need to not only catch up to but also 
exceed the base firm’s productivity level, if it wished to eliminate its economic losses.  
Therefore, if , this could suggest evidence of “powerful” price caps, and/or 
price caps that are designed to stimulate both catch-up and continuing improvements 
in TFP.     
S
tiTFP,
*
,, titi PP < 1, <RtiTPP
S
titi TFP,, <Π
S
tiTFP,
1, <RtiTPP
In contrast, if  then  and as a result , this is 
consistent with regulatory prices not having been set to incentivize a firm to fully 
close its productivity gap with the base firm. This could result for a variety of reasons.  
One potential reason is the common regulatory practice of setting price caps in a 
manner that allows required catch up productivity gains to be accomplished over 
several years rather than immediately. However, this situation could also be taken as 
evidence of “weak” regulation that does not fully penalize unproductive firms and 
cause them to suffer economic losses unless they improve their productivity.  As UK 
regulators, for example,  have a duty to maintain the financial viability of regulated 
companies as well as to improve their productivity,  this could even be justified by 
regulators on the grounds that less productive firms would go bust if tough price caps 
were set and they were unable to sufficiently improve their productivity performance.      
*
,, titi PP > 1, >RtiTPP Stiti TFP,, >Π
As the above paragraph illustrates, there are plausible and potentially 
appropriate reasons why regulators may choose to set .  Moreover, even if 
, the regulator may still have set output prices in a manner that is designed to 
better incentivize laggard firms to improve their productivity performance, even if 
they are not required to close the full productivity gap with the base firm.  It is 
therefore worthwhile to carefully define several critical values of  that can be 
*
,, titi PP >
*
,, titi PP >
R
tiTPP ,
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used to characterise the power of price cap regulation. As discussed above, if  
a firm could only eliminate its economic losses by fully catching up to the base firm’s 
TFP level.  Therefore, if ,  we can characterize price regulation as “powerful” 
as is such that a firm could only eliminate its economic losses by catching up to 
and then exceeding the base firm’s TFP.     
1, =RtiTPP
1, <RtiTPP
tiP,
In contrast, if  regulation is somewhat dampened in its effect as 
economic losses can be eliminated without improving TFP to the level of the base 
firm. However, there is still a clear distinction between “catch-up promoting” 
regulatory price caps which still retain some incentives to improve productivity, and 
“weak” price caps, which allow a laggard firm to potentially earn economic profits 
regardless of whether its productivity is improved. Thus, if , but 
1, >RtiTPP
1, >RtiTPP
S
ti
R
ti TFPTPP ,, 1< , price caps are “catch-up promoting” as they require some, but not full 
catch up in TFP to eliminate economic losses.  In contrast, if StiRti TFPTPP ,, 1> , price 
caps are “weak” as prices are high enough for the firm to achieve economic profits 
despite its low productivity levels, thereby suggesting relatively weak incentives for 
the firm to improve its productivity    
We finally note that it is worthwhile to define a regulatory excess cost index 
S
ti
R
ti TFPE ,, 1= , which given the assumption of exogenous input prices,  provides an 
index of  the excess of a firm’s costs relative to those that would be achieved if it 
achieved the productivity benchmark.   If , but , then the revenues 
achieved by a firm i when its output prices exceed optimal prices are lower than the 
“excess costs” relative to the benchmark costs resulting in economic losses . 
However, if , but , then the revenues achieved by a firm i when its 
output prices exceed optimal prices are greater than the “excess costs” relative to the 
benchmark costs resulting in economic profits 
1, >RtiTPP RtiRti ETPP ,, <
)1( , <Π ti
1, >RtiTPP RtiRti ETPP ,, >
1)( , >Π ti .  Thus, it should be clear that 
if   then the regulator has set prices that require laggard firms to improve 
their productivity/eliminate their excess costs, if they wish to return to economic 
profitability.   
R
ti
R
ti ETPP ,, <
In sum, our discussion highlights that if both productive and allocative 
efficiency are the goals of price cap regulation, any firm in a regulated industry that 
has the productivity of the “best practice firm” should in principle have output prices 
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that result in zero economic profits, while less productive firms should have output 
prices that would result in economic losses unless they improve their productivity. 
Therefore, the regulator needs to take into account the impact of both TFP and TPP in 
the overall performance of the companies when setting price caps. Moreover, at a 
theoretical level, systematic deviation of  from a value of 1 can be seen as 
evidence of deviation from the goal of setting prices that are consistent with a strict 
interpretation of both the incentive and allocative efficiency based justification for 
price cap regulation. Similarly, if  regulated output prices are high enough 
to violate a looser interpretation of appropriate incentive regulation, which requires 
only partial productivity catch up to achieve economic profitability.  Given this 
theoretical discussion, our next section therefore discusses a methodological approach 
that allows the development of these ideas in an empirical application. 
R
tiTPP ,
R
ti
R
ti ETPP ,, >
3. Multilateral Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability 
Computations 
In this section, we employ a multilateral Fisher index approach to measure 
profitability, productivity and price performance across companies at any given year 
(multilateral spatial comparisons). When the price and quantities across different 
companies are compared, it is important that such comparisons are undertaken for 
every pair of companies being considered (multilateral comparisons). However, in 
order to achieve consistency between all the pairs of comparisons we need to derive 
multilateral indexes that fulfill the property of transitivity. Internal consistency 
(transitivity) implies that a direct comparison between two firms gives the same result 
when comparing indirectly these two firms through a third firm.  
Bilateral Fisher output and input indexes between two firms i and j in the case 
of outputs and inputs are respectively,  and where: m n FjiY ,
F
jiX ,
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m
j
m
i YY    and    denote the quantities for the  output for firms mth i and j  respectively, 
whereas  present the quantities for the  inputs for firms nj
n
i XX    and   nth i and j  
respectively. Moreover,  are prices for the mth  output, while 
 denote input prices. The Fisher output and input indexes measure firm 
m
j
m
i PP    and   
n
j
n
i WW    and   
i’s output and input as a proportion of firm j  and  are the geometric means of 
Laspeyers and Paasche output and input indexes. For instance, Laspeyers output and 
input indexes use company j ’s prices to weight quantity changes, whereas Paasche 
output and input indexes use firm i’s prices to weight quantity changes.  The bilateral 
Fisher productivity index can then be constructed as a ratio of the Fisher output index 
relative to the Fisher input index: 
 
F
ji
F
jiF
ji X
Y
TFP
,
,
, =                                                                                            (6) 
 
The above formula is a binary comparison that can be applied directly when we are 
only interested in making comparisons between two firms. However, when we are 
interested in making meaningful comparisons between more than two firms, the 
multilateral nature of spatial comparisons creates some difficulties, which arise from 
the fact that more than two firms are compared at the same time. Firstly, the number 
of comparisons may be quite large depending on the number of companies that we 
have in our sample so the calculation of productivity index can be quite difficult. 
Secondly, we need consistent comparisons between all firms such that the relative 
comparisons between any two firms are consistent with other comparisons 
(transitivity). 
Following standard practice, the process of calculating a transitive Fisher 
output ( ) and input ( ) indices begins by calculating all the possible binary 
comparisons, 
F
jiY ,
F
jiX ,
Iji ,...,1, = where I  is the total number of companies, and results in the 
following II ×  matrices of binary comparisons: 
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These binary Fisher indices can be converted into multilateral consistent 
transitive indices by applying the EKS method developed by Elteto-Koves (1964) and 
Szulc (1964) to derive transitive Fisher indices (see Caves, Christensen and Diewert 
(1982a), Diewert and Lawrence (2006), Caves et al (1981), Ball et al (2001) for a 
discussion on multilateral transitive indices).  We therefore derive transitive Fisher 
output and input indices using the EKS method, which is equivalent to taking the 
geometric mean of the I possible direct and indirect (through any possible 3rd firm k) 
binary Fisher comparisons of firms i and j.   The resulting Fisher output and input 
indices,  and  therefore fulfill the transitivity property: SijY
S
ijX
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Adopting the terminology of the price index literature (Hill, 2004) we refer to these 
multilateral output and input indices as spatial indices, as they provide spatially 
consistent measures across all firms.   
The spatial total factor productivity Fisher index for a firm  relative to firmi j , 
, can then be constructed as a ratio of the spatial Fisher output index relative to 
spatial Fisher input index: 
S
jiTFP,
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However, one can also derive fully equivalent transitive Fisher productivity indices 
using the EKS method by directly taking the geometric mean  of all I possible direct 
and indirect (through any possible 3rd firm k) binary Fisher productivity comparisons 
of firms i and j: 
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The resulting index fulfills the transitivity property since it is derived using the EKS 
method, so any direct comparison between two firms and i j is the same with an 
indirect comparison between these two firms with a third firm : k
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While we can generate the II ×  possible transitive spatial output, input and 
productivity indexes between all firms, transitivity also implies that all meaningful 
information with regard to relative productivity is available in a subset of only I  of 
these indices. Thus, if we arbitrarily choose one firm as a base firm and set , then 
each spatial measure, is a measure of firm i  relative to the chosen base firm and we 
can also simplify notation such that TFP . Therefore, 
productivity relative to the base firm’s productivity can be expressed as: 
bj =
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However, this simplification comes at no loss of generality as another spatial 
productivity measure between any given firms can simply be calculated as 
.  Similarly, and . Sj
S
i
S
ji TFPTFPTFP /, = SjSiSji YYY /, = SjSiS ji XXX /, =
If spatial comparisons are available for each of T time periods indexed by t , 
and we assume the same base firm in all years, we can define the spatial productivity 
of firm relative to firm b at time t  as:  i
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These TI ×  measures then form the elements of a complete set of spatial comparisons 
indicating the productivity, output and input of firm  relative to the base firm at time 
t, and can be succinctly illustrated in the matrices:   
i
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Moreover, we report TI ×  measures of a regulatory excess cost index for any firm i 
at time t as the inverse of the spatial productivity, StiRti TFPE ,, 1= , which given the 
assumption of exogenous input prices,  provides an index of  the excess of a firm’s 
costs relative to those that would be achieved if it achieved the productivity 
benchmark. The set of the TI ×  measures of the regulatory excess cost index can be 
illustrated in the following matrix: 
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We now turn our discussion to the construction of the spatial total price performance 
index, ( )StiTPP ,  and then the regulatory total price performance index, ( )RtiTPP , . In (1) 
we defined the spatial total price performance of any firm i relative to the base firm as 
a ratio of output prices to input prices relative to the base firm. Since we defined the 
spatial TFP index as the productivity index of any firm relative to the best productive 
firm, we similarly define the spatial TPP index as the price performance index of any 
firm relative to the price performance of the most productive firm. To accomplish 
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this, we firstly express turnover of a firm i relative to the base firm as .,,, tbti
S
ti RRR =  
The spatially consistent aggregate output price index, ( )StiP ,  is then calculated as 
.,,,
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ti YRP = Similarly, we express nominal economic costs of a firm i relative to the 
base firm as .,,, tbti
S
ti CCC =  The spatially consistent aggregate input price index, 
( )StiW ,  is then calculated as .,,, StiStiSti XCW =  Finally, a spatially consistent  TPP index 
of any firm i relative to the base firm at any given time t, ( )StiTPP ,  can be obtained as:   
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 By rearranging (4) an estimate of  can be obtained as a function of  firm 
specific  economic profitability, 
R
tiTPP ,
ti ,Π , and the spatially consistent regulatory excess 
cost index, StiRti TFPE ,, 1= : 
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Recall that  measures the proportional deviation of output prices from those that 
are consistent with zero economic profits if the firm eliminated its excess regulatory 
costs. As discussed above, if  we can characterize price regulation as 
“powerful” in the sense of requiring full catch up to the base firm and further 
productivity improvement to regain economic profitability.  From (17) we can see that 
such “powerful” regulation has the empirically observable requirement that 
R
tiTPP ,
1, <RtiTPP
R
titi E ,, 1<Π . Similarly, our discussion above revealed that regulatory prices are 
“catch up promoting” if , which from (17) requires that .  E.g. 
firms are required to at least partially eliminate their regulatory excess costs if they 
wish to regain economic profitability. Thus, it should be clear that the relatively 
straight forward comparison of 
R
ti
R
ti ETPP ,, < 1, <Π ti
ti ,Π , , and  can provide extremely relevant 
information with regard to the relative power of regulatory price caps. 
R
tiE ,
R
tiTPP ,
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Before turning to our empirical application, we must simultaneously highlight 
both the strength, as well as a potential pitfall, of our index number based 
methodology.  Given that any model of company performance under regulation is 
only valuable if it can be empirically implemented, our methodology has the distinct 
advantage of potentially allowing for theoretically consistent cross sectional 
comparisons of relative productivity, profitability, and price performance, in samples 
with as few as 2 observations.  Thus, when compared to econometric and DEA based 
approaches to performance measurement, this is a distinct advantage.  However, when 
compared to other methodologies such as SFA and DEA. Our index number 
methodology does not allow us to as readily take into account differences in operating 
characteristics that may affect relative measures of productivity or price performance.   
Nevertheless, given that profitability is not influenced by these characteristics, and if 
differences in operating characteristics are relatively small, the methodology should 
be robust enough to accurately characterize trends in regulatory performance over 
time.  Moreover, as we will see below, even when we control for substantial cross 
sectional and inter temporal variation in the quality of water and sewerage services in 
England and Wales, our underlying conclusions with regard to the implied power of 
regulatory price caps is not affected, even though our estimates of underlying 
productivity catch up are substantially different.   
4. Data and the Impact of Quality Adjustment 
Our model includes separate outputs for water and sewerage services, and the 
three inputs, capital, labor and other inputs. The data covered are for the period 1991-
2008 for a balanced panel of 10 Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs). Water 
connected properties and sewerage connected properties are the proxies for water and 
sewerage output and are drawn from the companies’ regulatory returns to Ofwat. 
Water and sewage output prices were calculated as the ratio of the appropriate 
turnover in nominal terms, as available in Ofwat’s regulatory returns, to measured 
output, thereby allowing construction of binary Fisher Output indices.  These binary 
output indices then formed the basis of constructing fully spatially consistent output 
indices with the EKS method.  Finally, spatially consistent aggregate quality-
unadjusted output price indices were constructed as the ratio of relative aggregate 
turnover in nominal terms to this spatial aggregate quality-unadjusted output index, as 
discussed above.     
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Our physical capital stock measure is based on the inflation adjusted Modern 
Equivalent Asset (MEA) estimates of the replacement cost of physical assets 
contained in the companies’ regulatory accounts.  However, as periodic revaluations 
of these replacement cost values could create arbitrary changes in our measure of 
physical capital, we cannot directly employ these accounting based measures.  
Instead, we accept the year ending 2006 MEA valuations as our base value, and use 
net investment in real terms to update this series for earlier and later years.  Real net 
investment is therefore taken as the sum of disposals, additions, investments and 
depreciation, as deflated by the Construction Output Price Index (COPI).   Following 
Ofwat’s approach, we averaged the resulting year ending and year beginning 
estimates to provide a more accurate estimate of the average physical capital stock 
available to the companies in a given year.  
 We subsequently employee a user-cost of capital approach, to calculate total 
capital costs as the sum of the opportunity cost of invested capital and capital 
depreciation relative to the MEA asset values, and construct the price of physical 
capital as the user cost of capital divided by the above MEA based measure of 
physical capital stocks.  The opportunity cost of capital is defined as the product of 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) before tax and the companies’ average 
Regulatory Capital Value (RCV).  The RCV is the financial measure of capital stock 
accepted by Ofwat for regulatory purposes.  The WACC calculation is broadly 
consistent with Ofwat’s regulatory assumptions and is estimated with the risk free 
return assumed to be the average annual yields of medium-term UK inflation indexed 
gilts.  The risk premium for company equity and corporate debt was assumed to be 
2% following Ofwat’s approach at past price reviews. We also allowed for differences 
in company gearing ratios and effective corporate tax rates, which were calculated as 
the sum of aggregate current and deferred tax divided by the aggregate current cost 
profit before taxation. Finally, following the approach in Ofwat’s regulatory current 
cost accounts, capital depreciation was the sum of current cost depreciation and 
infrastructure renewals charge.    
The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees is available 
from the companies’ statutory accounts.  Firm specific labour prices were calculated 
as the ratio of total labour costs to the average number of full-time equivalent 
employees.   Other costs in norminal terms were defined as the difference between 
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operating costs and total labour costs.2   Given the absence of data allowing a more 
refined break out of other costs, we employ the  UK price index for materials and fuel 
purchased in purification and distribution of water, as the price index for other costs, 
and simply deflate nominal other costs by this measure to obtain a proxy for real 
usage of other inputs. Given these input quantity and price measures, we are able to 
calculate the spatially consistent indices of relative input usage discussed above.  As 
total nominal economic costs are obtained as the sum of total capital costs, labour 
costs and other costs in nominal terms, division of this sum by the spatially consistent 
input index, allows construction of spatially consistent input price indices.  Finally, 
economic profits are calculated as the difference between turnover and calculated 
economic costs.   
We now have the necessary set of output and input quantity and price 
measures, as well as the necessary profit, cost, and turnover measures to proceed with 
out model.  However, as differences in operating characteristics may result in 
legitimate differences in required inputs to produce a given output, variation in 
measured spatial productivity may result partially from these differences.  We would 
argue that while most such characteristics, such as density of population supplied, or 
differences in sources of water supply, etc., have an impact on relative performance, 
these differences are largely stable over time, and will also have only a small impact 
on explaining differences between the required inputs of WaSCs.   In other words, if 
we are primarily focussed on measuring changes in relative performance over time, 
the stability of these differences in characteristics as well as their relatively small 
impact on input requirements, will not significantly influence trends in relative 
productivity performance.  Nevertheless, as we wish to test the impact of operating 
characteristics on our model results, and because past research has demonstrated that 
quality improvements do significantly impact temporal productivity estimates, we 
also adapt our model to allow for the cross sectional and intertemporal variation in the 
sewage and drinking water quality.   
As is well documented in past studies, the water and sewerage companies have 
been obliged to carry substantial capital investment projects in order to improve water 
and sewerage quality and environmental standards. Thus, it is important to measure 
                                                 
2 While it would be particularly desirable to disaggregate other input usage data further, and in 
particular to allow for separate energy and chemical usage inputs, the data available at company level 
from Ofwat’s regulatory return does not allow a further meaningful decomposition of other input 
usage. 
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the impact of quality in our profitability, productivity and price performance 
measures. We therefore calculated quality-adjusted measures of output for water and 
sewerage services, as the product of water output and a drinking water quality index 
and sewerage output and sewage treatment quality index respectively.   
Following Saal and Parker (2001) the drinking water quality index is 
calculated as the ratio of the average percentage of each WaSC’s water supply zones 
that are fully compliant with key water quality parameters, relative to the average 
compliance percentage for England and Wales in 1991. Water supply zones are areas 
designated by the water companies by reference to a source of supply in which not 
more than 50,000 people reside. The data were drawn from the DWI’s annual reports 
for drinking water quality for the years ending 1991-2007. Due to changes in some of 
the drinking water quality standards and the new regulations, we employed six water 
quality parameters3 that are also employed by Ofwat to reflect how well treatment 
works and distribution systems are operated and maintained (Ofwat, 2006).  
The sewage treatment quality index is defined as a weighted index of the 
percentage of connected population for which sewage receives primary treatment and 
the percentage of population for which sewage receives at least secondary treatment.  
It also implicitly includes the percentage of connected population for which sewage is 
not treated with a zero weight. This data choice reflects both the availability of 
consistent data capturing quality trends for the entire 1991-2008 period, and does 
clearly capture substantial increases in sewage treatment levels, particularly in the 
earlier part of the sample period.  The sewage treatment data were taken from 
Waterfacts for the period 1990-91 to 1995-96 and the companies’ regulatory returns 
for the years 1996-97 to 2007-08.   
 It is clearly necessary to employ a weighted index of these measures as both 
the quality and costs of higher treatment levels exceed those associated with non 
treatment or primary treatment alone.  We therefore endeavoured to construct a cost 
based weighting system, although the necessary data to accomplish this was relatively 
limited.  However, we were able to calculate relative cost measures based on the ratio 
of sewerage treatment costs to volumes of sewerage treatment, using two alternative 
cost estimates available from company regulatory returns.  One of these alternative 
                                                 
3 The six water quality parameters, which form the Operational Performance Index (OPI) are iron, 
manganese, aluminium, turbidity, faecal coliforms and trihalomethanes.  The resulting drinking wate 
quality index suggests an increase in quality of 10.3 percent between 1991 and 2008 after aggregating 
the data for all WaSCs.   
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estimates was based on total sewerage treatment functional expenditure and direct 
costs for all treatment works, while the other was based on total sewage treatment 
costs for large treatment works only. These estimates suggest that higher levels of 
treatment are 1.68 to 2.40 times more costly than primary treatment only.  Given this 
estimate range, we chose to weight the percentage of population receiving secondary 
treatment of sewage or more twice as much as the percentage receiving primary 
treatment only.  While admittedly, somewhat ad hoc, we emphasize there is some 
empirical evidence to support these weights.  Moreover, we note that it is 
straightforward to demonstrate that the resulting weighted quality index is nested 
between an index based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least 
primary sewage treatment, which would underestimate gains in sewage treatment 
quality, and one based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least 
secondary sewage treatment, which would overestimate gains in sewage treatment 
quality.4   
Once the quality adjusted water and sewerage outputs are constructed, quality 
adjusted indices are straightforward to produce, by simply repeating the procedures 
identified above to first produce spatially consistent quality adjusted output indices 
( ).  A spatial aggregate quality-adjusted aggregated output price index is  then 
constructed as 
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impact on spatial output quantities will be perfectly balanced by changes in spatial 
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4 To highlight this, we note that while our weighted index implies an increase in sewage treatment 
quality of 19.3% for all England and Wales between 1991 and 2008, an index based only on population 
receiving at least primary treatment would indicate a quality improvement of 13.7% while one based 
only on the percentage of population receiving at least secondary treatment of sewage would indicate a 
25.4% quality improvement.  However, our approach not only provides a mid range estimate between 
these two more extreme measures, but also better reflects the process of improving sewage treatment 
quality that occurred through both treating previously untreated sewage, and increasing the level of 
sewage treatment.   
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equivalently that the quality adjusted excess cost index can be expressed as  
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ti QEE =  Similarly, quality adjusted regulatory price performance can be 
expressed as Sti
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, = and economic profitability can be decomposed as:  
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Thus, for example, if we assume that , which implies that firm i has lower 
measured quality than the base firm, the quality adjusted model will result in 
, but .  This demonstrates that without quality 
adjustment,  does not reveal the full extent of the firm’s excess costs due to low 
productivity, while  also results in a perfectly proportional understatement of 
the excess of allowed revenues to benchmark costs. However, these relationships also 
suggest that only if  deviates significantly from 1, will there be significant 
differences between the results and policy implications of the quality-adjusted and 
quality-unadjusted models.   
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5. Empirical Results  
 
Before turning to our model results, we first consider trends in aggregate 
WaSC turnover, costs and profits since privatization, as reported in Figure 1.  As we 
should expect, these trends closely follow the regulatory cycle.  Thus, a substantial 
economic loss in 1991 was rapidly eliminated and the industry became increasingly 
profitable until 1994, when Ofwat not only declared that it would exercise its right to 
review the relatively lax 10 year price caps set at privatisation after five years, but that 
it would also effectively rescind the price increases of firms which used their full 
price cap allowance in 1995 in the new five year price review that would come into 
effect in 1996. Even though the first price review in 1994/95 tightened regulatory 
price increases, economic profits remained positive despite falling from 565 to 70 
million pounds between 1994 and 1998. Moreover, perhaps reflecting increased 
incentives to contain costs, there is a noticeable shift in cost trend between 1998 and 
2000, and this led the aggregate WaSCS to achieve their highest nominal economic 
profitability in 2000 with profits of 680 million pounds.   
The 1999 price review, which set prices for 2001-2005, marked a shift to 
considerably tighter regulation by Ofwat. Thus, the 10 year trend of above inflation 
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price increases that had been justified as necessary to fund the industry’s capital 
investment needs, was followed by a substantial reduction in regulatory price caps in 
2001, which Ofwat justified as necessary in order to pass cost savings to consumers.    
This shift in regulation is evidenced by the fall in aggregate turnover from 6,279 to 
5,815 million pounds between 2000 and 2001, which is the only example of a nominal 
decline in aggregate WaSC revenue during the entire 1991-2008 period.  When 
coupled, with the substantial increase in aggregate economic costs in 2001, which can 
be substantially explained by RPI inflation effects which particularly effect the 
estimated normal rate of return on invested capital between 1999 and 2002, this 
resulted in  aggregate WaSC losses to 502 million pounds in 2001.   
These economics losses do not only reflect a momentary blip in turnover or 
estimated economic costs in 2001, but rather suggest the institution of a consistently 
tighter regulatory regime.  Thus, despite nominal turnover increasing in every year 
after 2001, aggregate economic cost increases outstripped allowed revenue increases 
until 2005 when aggregate economic losses had fallen to 544 million pounds.  
Moreover, although the implementation of the 2004 price review in 2006 appears to 
have allowed for a momentarily closer link between regulated revenues and costs, 
thereby reducing aggregate economic losses to 43 million pounds, subsequent revenue 
increases have been by far outstripped by increases in economic costs, and by 2008 
economic losses again increased to 568 million pounds.  Thus, even a straightforward 
analysis of aggregate WaSC economic profits suggests a shift from a regulatory 
policy that tolerated above normal returns for the entire period before 2000, to one 
which set prices resulting in below normal returns after 2000.  
Given these general trends, we begin the presentation of our model results 
with Figure 2, which depicts the geometric average, as well as the range of WaSC 
profitability over the sample period. We also remind the reader that reported 
economic profitability reflects actual firm profitability based on firm specific 
economic costs and revenues, and is in no way influenced by spatial comparisons.  
These firm specific indices largely confirm the conclusions drawn from Figure 1.  
Thus, profitability peaked in 1994 when the average company made a profit of 12.9%, 
the most profitable firm made a profit of 30.2%, and the least profitable firm made an 
economic profit of 0.04%. Regulatory tightening does appear to have shifted this 
range downward by 1998, but without substantially tightening the range of observed 
profitability given that the maximum, average, and minimum profitability respectively 
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fell to 1.152, 1.016, and 0.913.  However, by 2000 economic profitability reached its 
highest observed levels as the average company made a profit of 13.7% above the 
normal rate of return, the highest observed economic profit was 30.7%, and the lowest 
economic profit was 1.5%. While these high profits in 2000 at least partially reflect 
the observed reduction in total economic costs between 1998 and 2000, we would 
emphasize the continued wide range in observed profitability before 2000, as well as 
the lack of a significant number of firms that made economic losses after 1991.  
Moreover, this high profitability is indicative of what in hindsight were inappropriate 
regulated prices, as prices appear to have had little relationship to the actual economic 
costs of firms, let alone benchmark economic costs.    
Figure 2 highlights the dramatic shift in regulatory practice implemented in 
the 1999 price review. Thus, in 2001, not only did average economic profitability fall 
to a loss of 7.4%, but the range of observed economic profitability tightened 
substantially as the highest observed profit was 3.6%, and the most extreme loss was 
11.3%.  This substantially reduced range in estimated economic profitability, which is 
sustained in every year after 2000, suggests that Ofwat more closely aligned regulated 
revenues with actual firm costs after the 1999 price review, and particularly in 2006 
which was the first year of the current price review period.  Moreover, the consistent 
economic losses realized by many firms during this period also suggest that Ofwat 
had begun to deliberately set revenues below actual economic costs, so as to better 
incentivize firms to reduce their excessive regulatory costs.    
Before considering our spatial estimates of quality unadjusted ( )and 
adjusted ( ) regulatory excess costs
.,
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tiE
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tiE
,
,
5, which are respectively reported in Figure 4 
and Figure 5, we first consider the average and range of the spatial implicit quality 
index ( ) over the sample period so that we can highlight the significant role of StiQ ,
                                                 
5 We have not identified firms for confidentially reasons.  The same firm is consistently found to have 
the highest spatial productivity estimates for both quality unadjusted and quality adjusted models in all 
years, and is therefore modelled as the benchmark most productive firm in each year of our study  
Moreover, we note that his same firm was found to have the highest spatial productivity estimates in 
each year of the study regardless of whether we applied the spatially consistent Fisher indices provided 
in the main text, similar spatially consistent Tornqvist indices, or the multilateral translog index for 
WaSCs based on the Tornqvist index developed by Caves et al (1982a). Furthermore, there is little 
substantive difference between the results regardless of which method is employed.     
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quality in our results.6 Figure 3 demonstrates that over the entire sample period, the 
once wide divergence in the spatial implicit quality index was eliminated, as the 
companies improved their drinking and sewerage treatment quality conditions relative 
to the most productive company. Thus, in 1991, the average and worst performing 
company’s implicit quality index were respectively only 83.7% and 71.5% of the base 
firm’s measured quality, while the highest observed quality exceeded the most 
productive firm’s measured quality by 3.9%. In contrast, in 2008, the average and 
worst company’s quality index were respectively 97.1% and 92.6% relative to the 
most productive company. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that despite significant 
investment in drinking water and sewage quality improvement throughout the sample 
period, little to no convergence in the average and minimum relative quality index 
occurred before 1998, while most of this convergence occurred between 1998 and 
2003. This is likely to reflect what were in fact considerable lags between the 
provision of revenues necessary to fund quality improving capital investments, and 
the actual date when the resulting quality improving assets became operational.  
As, Sti
R
ti
QR
ti QEE ,,
,
, = , and since  for almost all the observations in our 
sample, the geometric average of quality unadjusted excess costs( ) reported in 
Figure 4 is always lower than the geometric average of quality adjusted excess costs 
( ) reported in Figure 5, and the proportional difference is equal to the geometric 
average of  reported in Figure 3. Moreover, the strong convergence in  
documented in Figure 3, explains the considerably lower convergence of unadjusted 
excess costs over the sample period when compared to the convergence of quality 
adjusted excess costs. Thus, between 1991 and 2008 average quality unadjusted 
excess costs only declined from 1.27 to 1.205, thereby suggesting that on average 
productivity catch up by laggard firms contributed only a 5.39% reduction in WaSC 
costs.  In contrast, average quality adjusted excess costs decreased from 1.518 to 
1.242, thereby suggesting a much more considerable 18.18% reduction in average 
costs attributable to productivity catch up by laggard firms. The latter estimate, which 
is broadly consistent with estimates of cost savings attributable to eliminating 
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6 The maximum of the spatial implicit quality index is marginally above 1 in almost yeas of the sample.  
This reflects the fact that while the base firm is chosen based on its superior quality unadjusted and 
quality adjusted spatial productivity estimates, its spatial implicit quality index is marginally inferior to 
at least one firm in the sample.  
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efficiency made by Ofwat, demonstrates the empirical necessity of controlling for 
quality over the 1991-2008 period. However, the lack of significant quality 
differences after 2003, when the average of  always exceeds 0.97, suggest that 
results in this latter period will not be significantly affected by the quality adjustment 
method employed in this study. Stated differently, this implies that quality adjustment 
is necessary if we wish to consider long term trends in the industry, but has very little 
influence on estimates of excess costs in recent years, which is important if we 
consider it is precisely these latter estimates that are most relevant for the forthcoming 
2009 price review.   
S
tiQ ,
Given this general discussion of the excess cost estimates, we now discuss 
their implication when set in context of the regulatory history of the English and 
Welsh water industry. Despite the wide divergence between estimated quality 
unadjusted and adjusted excess costs in the early years of the sample, there is 
nonetheless a remarkable convergence with regard to evidence demonstrating the 
failure of the regulatory system to eliminate of excess costs during this period.  Thus, 
average quality unadjusted excess costs increased from 27.0% to 27.7% between 1991 
and 1995 while average quality adjusted excess costs increased from 51.8% to 53.6%.  
Even more strikingly, the worst laggard firms saw their quality unadjusted excess 
costs increase from 47.3% to 59.2% over the same period, while their estimated 
quality adjusted excess costs increased from 102.1% to 123.3%.   Thus, there is clear 
evidence that during the WaSCs first five years under price cap regulation, little to no 
improvement in relative productivity/cost performance occurred.  
As there is a general consensus that during the 1990s Ofwat’s price capping 
policies was strongest between 1994 and 1997 it is interesting to note that both the 
quality unadjusted and adjusted excess cost indices fall to a temporary low in 1997, 
when average quality unadjusted excess costs fell to 20.9% and average quality 
adjusted excess costs fell to 45.0% of benchmark costs.  However, this reduction in 
excess costs was not sustained in the quality unadjusted model, and its decline was 
temporarily halted in the quality adjusted model. As a result, if we focus on changes 
over the formal five year price cap period covering 1996 to 2000, there is a 
considerable difference in the implications of the unadjusted and quality adjusted 
results. Thus, the quality unadjusted results reported in Figure 4, provide limited 
evidence of sustained convergence in average excess costs, which fall from 27.7% to 
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25.0%, while the quality adjusted results suggest a substantial fall in average excess 
costs from 53.6% to 41.7%.  Moreover, while quality unadjusted results suggest no 
sustained improvement in the excess costs of the worst laggard firm, which actually 
saw its excess costs increase from 59.2% to 61.1%, the quality adjusted results 
suggest a considerable improvement in laggard firm performance, given that the 
maximum quality adjusted excess cost estimate fell from 123.3% to 69.2%. We would 
suggest that this difference is indicative of the need to control for substantial 
differences in quality, as well as convergence in quality, if one wishes to properly 
measure spatial differences in productivity/excess costs. Nevertheless, given that even 
the quality adjusted excess cost index does not show sustained improvement before 
1998, these results may also suggest that the tightening of regulation also acted to 
reduce the lag between provision of revenues for quality enhancement programmes 
and their delivery.   
Our results do suggest consistent trends with regard to regulatory excess costs 
for the five year period covered by the 1999 price review, even if the quality 
unadjusted results, show a much more dampened reduction in excess costs. Thus, 
between 2000 and 2005, on average the quality unadjusted excess cost index fell from 
1.250 to 1.216, while the quality adjusted index fell from 1.417 to 1.243. Both 
measures also show relatively large average and laggard firm excess cost reductions 
in 2001, although it must be noted that the magnitude of the quality adjusted excess 
cost reduction is influenced by the largest observed annual quality increase for both 
the average and the lowest observed spatial implicit quality index. It is also notable 
that both indexes also suggest a considerable improvement in regulatory excess costs 
in 2005. The excess cost results therefore suggest that firms’ cost reducing efforts 
were concentrated in 2001 in a clear response to the large reduction in maximum 
allowed prices in the first year of the price period, and in the last year of the period, 
which may suggest they were working to reduce costs to improve their position for 
the 2006-10 price determination. Moreover, particularly if we focus on the worst 
laggard firms as represented by the maximum observed excess cost estimates, which 
declined from 1.611 to 1.469 in the unadjusted model and from 1.692 to 1.490 in the 
quality adjusted model, there is fairly clear evidence that the tightening of price caps 
in the 1999 review led to sustained improvements in the relative productivity 
performance of laggard firms.   
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The immediate impact of the 2004 price review, which allowed for an initial 
increase in operating costs in 2006, has already been observed in Figure 1 and Figure 
2, where there is a clear shift from substantial economic losses in 2005 to a near 
perfect alignment between revenues and estimated economic costs in 2006.  This may 
or may not be justified on the grounds that Ofwat has a duty to maintain the financial 
viability of firms in addition to its duty to promote efficiency. Nevertheless, our 
excess cost results suggest that the realignment of regulated revenues with actual costs 
led to an immediate increase in excess costs relative to benchmark costs in 2006, an 
increase which is consistent with the reduction in regulatory incentives to reduce costs 
in 2006.  However, as price caps in years subsequent to 2006 reverted to allowing 
below inflation price increases, it would appear that the industry not only reverted to 
economic losses, but also began to improve excess costs relative to the base firm.  
Nevertheless, while geometric average quality adjusted excess costs fell from 27.8% 
to 24.2% between 2006 and 2008, as firms again worked to improve productivity 
relative to benchmark levels, the negative impact of the momentary loosening of price 
caps in 2006 is demonstrated by the fact that average quality adjusted excess costs in 
2008 were only 0.1% lower than they were in 2005.   
Given this discussion of regulatory excess costs, which measure the excess of 
actual costs relative to benchmark costs, Figures 6 and 7 now focus our attention on 
regulatory TPP, which measures the excess of regulated revenues to benchmark costs, 
thereby allowing a direct estimate of the tightness of regulatory price caps.  From 
1991 to 1994, both the unadjusted and quality adjusted results quantify what 
amounted to a significant loosening in regulatory price caps, as the average excess of 
regulated revenues to benchmark costs respectively increased from 16% to 44.8% and 
from 38.7% to 74.2%. In contrast, after 1995 the average values of   and 
 both suggest a considerable tightening of price caps that persisted until 1998 
when they respectively indicate that regulated revenues exceeded benchmark costs by 
26.6% and 50.6%.  However, during the last two years of the 1996-2000 price cap 
period, average regulatory TPP again increased, thereby suggesting that price caps 
had effectively become looser again.   
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The increased and sustained regulatory demands of the 1999 price review are 
clearly illustrated in the dramatic fall in estimated regulatory TPP between 2000 and 
2001. Thus, in a single year, the average excess of regulated revenues over benchmark 
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costs respectively decreased from 42.2% to 13.5% and from 61.2% to 20.4% for the 
unadjusted and quality adjusted models.  Moreover, the wide dispersion in regulatory 
TPP, which suggests a more accommodative policy for laggard firms up to 2000 also 
came to a sudden end, as the range of allowed excess revenues relative to benchmark 
costs tightened, and in particular, regulatory TPP for the worst performing firms was 
reduced more than for other firms.  If we focus on , as illustrated in Figure 7 
this tightening in the range of regulatory rigour is illustrated by the decline of 51.3% 
in the maximum value of  while the minimum value only declined by 23.0%.    
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While our regulatory TPP estimates largely suggest continuity in regulatory 
policy for the post 2000 period, they do provide evidence for a small loosening of 
price caps in 2006 followed by a return to tougher price caps.  Thus between 2005 and 
2006  average  and  respectively increased from 1.123 to 1.245 and 
from 1.149 to 1.269, thereby suggesting an average increase of 12% in the excess of 
allowed revenues to benchmark costs.  However, by 2008 average  and  
had respectively fallen to 1.131 and 1.165, thereby demonstrating the return to price 
caps that were of broadly equivalent tightness to those that had been in place in 2005.   
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In order to clearly illustrate our underlying model of regulatory price caps, 
Figures 8 and 9 respectively report the decomposition of average economic 
profitability into regulatory TPP and regulatory excess costs indices for the 
unadjusted and quality adjusted models. As both models suggest the same conclusions 
with regard to changes in regulatory policy over the sample period, we have chosen to 
focus on the quality adjusted models in the interest of brevity.  
As average substantially exceeds one in all sample years there is no 
evidence that the WaSCs have ever been subject to a “powerful” price cap regime 
requiring immediate full catch up to benchmark costs to regain economic profitability.  
Moreover, the trend in average  suggests that price caps became progressively 
looser until 1994 when on average regulated revenues exceeded benchmark costs by 
74.2 percent. As the quality adjusted excess cost index ( ) suggests that, on 
average, actual costs only exceeded benchmark costs by 54.2 percent in 1994, the lack 
of progress is reducing  before 1995, is fully consistent with the weak incentives 
created by regulatory price caps that allowed for increased economic profitability 
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even in the absence of any effort to improve productivity.  Subsequent declines in the 
average value of to 1.506 in 1998 demonstrate a substantial reduction in 
allowed revenues that is indicative of tighter regulation, as firms would at least be 
required to improve productivity in order to maintain their existing level of economic 
profitability in the future.  However, we emphasize again that even in 1998 average 
 still exceeded average , which was 1.483. Moreover, by 2000 average 
 had been allowed to increase to 1.612 while at the same time  declined 
to 1.417.  Thus, despite some improvements in incentives after 1994, 1991-2000 can 
still be characterized as a period of “weak” regulation  because  was generally 
allowed to exceed , thereby allowing the retention of above normal returns even 
in the absence of any effort to achieve benchmark productivity levels.    
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As our   measure clearly indicates that existing price caps in 2000 
were highly inappropriate and allowed firms to achieve average economic 
profitability of 13.7%, the dramatic tightening of price caps that took place in 2001 
was more than justified. Nevertheless, as the average and almost all firm specific 
estimates of  remained in excess of one even after 2001, there is no evidence 
that Ofwat moved to a “powerful” price cap regime as defined in Section 2. Instead, 
as clearly illustrated in Figure 9, after 2001, Ofwat effectively moved from a policy of 
setting price caps which allowed regulated revenues to exceed regulatory excess costs 
( ) to a policy of setting regulated revenues below regulatory excess costs 
( ).  Therefore, Ofwat’s dramatic regulatory tightening in 2001 amounted 
to a move from “weak” price caps that allowed economic profits even without 
productivity catch up to “catch up promoting” price caps that required the elimination 
of at least some excess costs in order to regain economic profitability.   
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While we would emphasize the overall persistence of this new policy for the 
entire post 2000 period, the near perfect alignment on average between  (1.269) 
and  (1.278) in 2006, followed by resumption of a price caps resulting in 
 in subsequent years suggests that Ofwat refined its price capping model 
in the 2004 price review. Specifically, our results suggest that Ofwat’s price caps 
effectively allowed companies their actual economic costs in 2006, but required catch 
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up productivity improvements in subsequent years.  This suggests the effective use of 
a hybrid regulatory model, where companies’ costs in the base year were accepted 
(rate of return?), but productivity improvements were expected in later years 
(benchmarking?).  However, as the average of  increased markedly from 1.243 to 
1.275 between 2005 and 2006, we would suggest that this hybrid system was 
inappropriate because the temporary dampening of  productivity enhancing incentives 
led to firms falling further behind the benchmark firm in 2006.  Thus, we would argue 
that a sustained policy of strictly “catch up promoting” price caps may have resulted 
in regulatory excess costs falling significantly below their 2005 levels by 2008.  
Instead, Ofwat’s apparent temporary dampening of incentives in 2006, would appear 
to have effectively eliminated 3 years of continued reduction in regulatory excess 
costs, as illustrated by the average  of 1.242 in 2008, which  was virtually 
unchanged from its level in 2005.   
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study analyzed the impact of regulation on the financial performance of 
water and sewerage companies in England and Wales over the period 1991-2008. We 
developed a cross sectional index number technique to decompose actual economic 
profitability into a spatial productivity and a regulatory price performance index and 
also measure the spatial implicit impact of quality. The inverse of the spatial 
productivity index is equivalent to a regulatory excess costs index, which denotes the 
excess of a firm’s actual costs relative to benchmark costs, whereas the regulatory 
price performance index measures the excess of revenues above benchmark costs. We 
then demonstrated that increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are 
indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation.  Moreover, we also 
showed that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess 
costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory 
price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”  
The results indicate  that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period price caps 
were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to 
immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic 
profitability.  As regulatory TPP increased markedly until 1994, we are able to 
quantify the extent to which price caps became laxer in the early post privatisation 
period, and how this offered firms the potential to increase their economic 
profitability without making any effort to reduce their regulatory excess costs. In 
contrast, between 1994 and 1998, a substantial reduction in regulatory TPP occurred, 
thereby quantifying the extent of regulatory tightening after the 1994 price review, as 
falling regulatory TPP implies that laggard firms must reduce their regulatory excess 
costs , or would otherwise face a reduction in economic profitability.  However, our 
results suggest a renewed increase in regulatory price performance between 1998 and 
2000, suggesting that regulatory incentives once again weakened during this period, 
and economic profitability reached its peak in 2000.  In sum, while our results do 
suggest substantial regulatory tightening after 1994, we would emphasize that the 
period 1991-2000 can be characterised as a period of “weak” regulation since allowed 
regulatory revenues almost always exceeded regulatory excess costs, thereby 
demonstrating that price caps during this period allowed firms to maintain economic 
 33
profitability regardless of whether they made any progress in catching up to 
benchmark productivity levels. 
Our methodology performs particularly well in demonstrating and quantifying 
the dramatic tightening of Ofwat’s regulatory policies in the 1999 price review.  Thus, 
a sharp tightening in regulation in 2001 is quantified as a substantial fall in the ratio of 
allowed regulatory revenues relative to benchmark costs, as measured by regulatory 
TPP.  Moreover, we also clearly demonstrate that Ofwat’s dramatic regulatory 
tightening in 2001 amounted to a move from “weak” price caps that allowed 
economic profits even without productivity catch up to “catch up promoting” price 
caps that required the elimination of at least some excess costs in order to regain 
economic profitability.   Furthermore, while our regulatory TPP index clearly 
demonstrates a momentary but substantial reduction in regulatory incentives in 2006, 
which was the first year of the current price review,  it also demonstrates a return to 
tighter regulation in subsequent years.  Thus, our results suggest that since 2001 
Ofwat has implemented “catch up promoting” price caps since average regulated 
revenues were always below average regulatory excess costs indicating that the firms 
were required to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to regain economic 
profitability.  We would also emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrate a 
much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001,  
Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be 
continued in the 2009 price review.  .   
We finally emphasize that our methodological approach is generally 
applicable.  This is because it allows regulators to assess relative performance in cases 
where the number of observations is extremely limited, thereby directly providing 
firm specific evidence of potential productivity catch up as measured by deviation 
from benchmark productivity levels, as well as evidence of the deviation of regulated 
revenues from those that would be consistent with benchmark costs.  Moreover it also 
facilitates a backward-looking approach that allows conclusions to be drawn with 
regard to the effectiveness of price cap regulation.  More specifically, using our 
methodology, regulators and policy makers can determine if past regulatory decisions 
have not only promoted productive efficiency by providing appropriate efficiency 
incentives to firms, but also whether they have led to increased allocative efficiency 
by aligning consumer prices more closely with efficient costs.   
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Despite the considerable benefits of the methodology employed in this paper, 
we are nonetheless aware that it only allows for the cross-sectional (spatial) 
measurement of productivity, regulatory price performance, and profitability; and the 
subsequent comparison of how these cross sectional measures have changed over 
time.   We therefore plan to extend our approach, by following Hill (2004), which 
suggests a framework for consistently integrating cross sectional and temporal index 
numbers.   As this will allow the simultaneous measurement of firm specific 
productivity growth, as well as the spatial relative productivity measures employed in 
this paper, this extension of the existing methodology would facilitate a forward 
looking approach that can provide evidence not only with regard to the potential 
productivity catch up of laggard firms, but also the potential for further improvements 
in benchmark productivity levels. We therefore emphasize that such an approach 
would further aid regulators wishing to determine appropriate X-factors for regulated 
firms, as it would not only provide evidence for potential productivity catch-up, as in 
the current approach, but would also provide evidence for further potential 
productivity improvements by benchmark firms.   
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Figure 1 - Aggregate WaSC Turnover, Costs and Profits: Millions of Pounds 
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Costs  4,018  4,091  4,106  4,222  4,618  5,155  5,274  5,700  5,818  5,598  6,317  6,087  6,405  6,900  7,273  7,580  8,627  9,062 
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Figure 2 - Economic Profitability: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 3 - Spatial Implicit Quality Index: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 4 – Regulatory Excess Costs Quality Unadjusted: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 5 – Regulatory Excess Costs Quality Adjusted: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 6 - Regulatory TPP Quality Unadjusted: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 7 - Regulatory TPP Quality Adjusted: Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure 8  - Quality Unadjusted  Economic Profitability, Regulatory TPP and 
Excess Costs: Geometric Average of Firm Specific Estimates 
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Figure  9  - Quality Adjusted  Economic Profitability, Regulatory TPP an d 
Excess Costs: Geometric Average of Firm Specific Estimates 
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